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Abstract 
To assess the security risk of an enterprise network, a security risk assessment model was designed based on 
simulated attack. The vulnerability of single computers and the threat of network attacks were both considered in this 
model. And then, experiments verify that this method from the model can effectively enhance the accuracy of 
network security risk assessment; so the method affords a more accurate the assessment of network risk status and 
better risk control strategy. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction
The traditional assessment method of enterprise network security risk was to classify the risk by the
detection of vulnerability, and the testing tools were as follows: IDS, Nessus, ISS and Loopholes in 
management analysis system etc.. However the tools mainly aimed at the safety performance of a single 
device, but they were worse at the analysis of that of the whole network.   
In documents 1, an attack model was constructed by the model checking to early warn attacks, but in 
the model, granularity was a great problem, and state space explosion was faced. In documents 2, 
incidence relations were described by propagation models to locate the most threatening risk sources. 
Potential risks were analysed in the angle of defenses, while the attacking characteristics and means were 
not taken into account. In documents 3, the impact of attacks were assessed based on the Network 
Performance indexes, which applied to the DDoS, but were not able to estimate other kinds of attacks. In 
documents 4, the presented privilege figure described the changes made in the invade by attackers of 
elevation of privileges, and calculated the average costs and time to analysed the degree of safety; 
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however, it did not show demonstrably the abilities of attackers, furthermore, it was very difficult for a 
large-scale system.  
Here is put forward a new-style risk assessment model based on simulated attack of university network 
security. Firstly, combined with the original value-at-risk detected on the standalone vulnerabilities, an 
attacking state diagram is brought about to simulate the invading process in which a simulated attacker 
takes advantage of the network weakness; and then, the generated attacking state diagram and the original 
value-at-risk are based on to identify the aggressive behaviours, possible routes, the changes of secure 
state and to assess quantitatively the sites of potential menaces and the risk degrees, and the new 
improved value-at-risk, which provide consequently more accurate reasons to carry out rightly risk 
control decisions. 
2. The security risk assessment model of enterprise network based on the simulation of attack 
(SAMA) 
Enterprise network security risks refer to some potential safety problems that the users of Enterprise 
Networks, unconsciously or consciously, destroy, steal and spread some sensitive information, and violate 
network operation. Enterprise network security analysis involves basic elements such as information 
identification, threat identification, vulnerability identification, loss judge, probability judge, risk 
calculations etc.: 
 
Fig. 1. SAMA 
SAMA is elaborate on below in Fig.1. The first layer is attack. In the layer, all kinds of features of 
security information elemental are analysed deeply and detailed, and the old risk assessment number ( OR ) 
of Enterprise Network is analysed with original methods. And then, attackers launch a attack on the 
Enterprise Network on the basis of OR ; The second layer is simulation. In the layer, simulating attack 
information, under the influence of OR , build upon a status diagram of attack, imitating the attacker to 
invade Enterprise Network from the Initial node( IN ) to the End node( EN ); the third layer is analytical one. 
In the layer, potential risks are estimated further quantificationally in the attacking path and risk, and the 
new risk assessment number ( NR ) is provided; In the end, risk control is implemented in line with NR  to 
devise effective security policy. 
2.1. Attack layer 
Attack layer mainly consists of five sorts of information as below: 
(1) Information of the host computer of Enterprise network. C（Computer）is supposed to be the set 
of the host computer. For Cc , )c,,,( idm osipac cccc  , acc m  is the address of C , ipc  is the IP 
address of C, osc  is the operating system of C, idc  is the identity of C.   
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(2) Relationships between host computers. They are network visitings and communicating ability etc., 
which are essential for attacks and shown as CPCT  ,  T means Transport, and P is Port. For 
instance, Tcpct  )( 211  means that the host computer 1c  can visit 2c  via port 1p . 
(3) Value information of host computers ( valueC ). valueC  is the values of various information and the levels 
of importance, and the consequences after the damage of the security attributes(confidentiality, integrity 
and usability) of the host computers. 
(4) Information of the vulnerability of host computers. Given leak is B, Bb , b  is described as a 
multivariant group: derivationtyptosndescriptiodatenamecve bbbbbbb ,,,,,, , each item of it is corresponding to CVE 
number, name, release date, description, influenced system and its versions, type and derivation. 
(5) Attacking information. They are the attributes of attackers which are obtained from the known 
aggressive behaviour rules. Aggressive behaviours are status information transfer which is brought about 
by attackers taking advantage of vulnerability of the network. It can be regarded as a mapping from 
attacking preconditions to attacking results. A (Attack) is supposed to be the information of this type, so it 
can be defined as: ),,,( ionauthorizatnameidipmac AAAAAA  , each item of it means the attacked host 
computer's  MAC address, IP address, identity, name and the user's authorization obtained after the 
successful attack.  
2.2. Simulation layer 
This layer mainly comes down to the definition and generation of status diagrams. 
2.2.1 Definition of status diagrams 
Definition one (attacking status diagram). The attacking status diagram of a enterprise network is a 
digraph ),,,( EI NNSNG  ，thereinto, N=set of node, S=set of edge, so NNS  , at the same time, S 
means the transfer relationship between statuses; IN  is the initial set of node, and EN  is the end one. If 
Nn , },,,{ valueionauthorizatnameid nnnnn  , each item of it is successively the listing of 
user's identity, user's name, access authority and value information of the host which has been obtained at 
present status. If Ss , },{ weighttoken sss  , Stoken is the token of the leaks dependent by the 
attack, and  Sweight is the weight of the side.   
Definition two (attacking route). In the attacking status diagram, a route is a finite sequence of the 
status: },...,1,0,,,...,,{ 10 miNnnnn im   , and Snn ii 1, . When the initial node is INn 0 and the 
terminal node is Em Nn  , this route is named an attacking route from the original state to the state of 
termination in which the invader attacks the targets successfully, in which the aggressive behaviours  are 
adopted in each side corresponding to the invading process.  
Definition three (safety targets). When safety targets of the system are expressed as D
（Destination）, if D=false, there is an attacking route that violates the security targets, conversely, if 
D=true, then attacking route does not exit. 
As for enterprise networks, when the set of state that violates the security targets is UD , to establish a 
attacking diagram is to trace all possible routes to the unsafe status of UD . So the attacking status diagram 
of enterprise network is a diagram constituent of various unsafe states and attacking actions that result in 
state transition. 
2.2.2 Generation of attacking diagrams 
Supposing that the attacker would not invade the host computers that have been achieved authorities, 
circuits would not turn up in the simulated attacking diagrams based on it. On this occasion, the 
generating algorithm of the attacking diagrams in SAMA is as below. 
Input: 
  ),,,(G EI NNSN  is the network attacking model; 
  N  is the set of state; 
  NNS   is the transition of state; 
  IN  is the set of original state; 
  OR  is the original value-at-risk; 
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  D  is the destination of security 
Output: 
),,,,(G D DE
D
I
DD
U NNSND  is the attacking diagrams. 
Algorithm: 
① On the basis of OR , IN , the original state set of the network system DIN  is established; 
② To establish the set of nodes. In each status of DIN , available aggressive behaviours are searched to 
find out all attainable statuses and add them into DN . 
③ In each status of DN , aggressive behaviour bank is hunted to locate all original attacking subsets 
AA i ; 
④ Simulate attacks on each rule in iA  transfer the systematic status, and then, add the successful status 
transitions into DS . If the transitions get to a new status, it is added into DN ; 
⑤ If there exits a attaching route, falseD  , and the value is located in UD ; 
⑥ Steps from ③-⑤ are to be repeated until each status in DN  has no available attack in aggressive 
behaviour bank to transit it further. 
⑦ The status without descendant nodes in DN  is sought to set up the set of termination state DDE NN  ;  
⑧ If the attacked objects are known, the successful states to them are to be located in DEN , and the 
related states and transitions in DN  and DS  are to be reserved, while the states of termination and the 
related states and transitions are to be deleted; 
⑨ UD , DN , DS , DIN , DEN  jointly constitute output parameters. 
2.3. Analytical Layer 
In this layer, DG  is analysed after it was acquired, that is, attacking diagram is analysed to learn the 
diffusion process of invasion and infiltrating capability, and  to obtain further more a new security value-
at-risk NR  of the enterprise network. Specific analyse is divided into two aspects as below.   
2.3.1 Analysing the route of attack 
At the beginning of the possible original state of invasion, state diagrams of attack are to be searched, 
then, all of routes can be detected in which the attacker assault the targets or destroy the Enterprise 
network information, and the set of threatened hosts is to be got, so that the remedial measures are to be 
taken immediately on the risky nodes and network links. 
It is known from above that iA  is shown as the resorting aggressive behaviours from state 1in  to in . 
2.3.2 Analysing the risk of attack 
Enduing each side with quantitative weight, we can quantificationally analyse the criticality of each 
attacking route, and locate more penetrating routes and network positions of high risk. 
  If in an attacking route of the length of M, the probability of transfer from state 1in  to state in  is ip , 
and the severity of iA  is iw , and the value of the invaded target host is iv , the potential value-at-risk in the 
route is: 

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Combined with the probability of successful attack, the severity of attack, the value of the host and the 
original value-at-risk of network security OR , a more accurate quantitative formula is provided of the 
security risk assessment of enterprise network in the paper.  
Assuming there are totally attacking routes of P, under the assumptions in Formula (1), a new formula 
about security risk assessment of enterprise network would be: 
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In Formula (2), synthetically based on weakness analysis and simulated attacks, the locations of high 
risks can be found out more exactly, and more accurate data can be provided to make homologous 
decisions in advance of risk controls. 
3. Experimental analysis 
To verify the validity of SAMA, here is estimated a case of network information system to clarify the 
practical superiority of the model in the field of security risk assessment of enterprise network.  
3.1. Experimental setting 
A-E are five host computer systems. A is the experiment server, offering the experimental setting; B-E 
supply information services, respectively the file server, Web server, database server and email server. 
  For the convenience of use or the need of Enterprise, in practice, services such as long-range control 
and visit are usually enabled or set ; on the other hand, for no patches are installed on the network system 
or other reasons, there exit more or less soft spots in the setting. While this case is really universal in 
certain degree, so we think the test results are of good real meaning.  
3.2. Analysis about experimental results 
The traditional security assessment methods about university network OM(Old method) pay close 
attention only to the safety performance of a single host, but overlook the attack of network  while SAMA 
take stand-alones and network synthetically into account. In order to estimate the superiority of SAMA to 
OM, SAMA is compared to the traditional method based on vulnerability analysis, and the experimental 
result is shown as Figure 2, the abscissa in it presents the detected hosts. Simulated attack is tested in 
sequence, that is, when the number of host is 1, only A  is tested, and when the number of host is 2, only 
A and B are tested, and others are tested by parity of reasoning. The vertical coordinates indicate the 
numbers of risk detected. 
Fig.2 Comparison of assessment results between modeling and traditional methods 
It is demonstrated that in the view of case, SAMA is valid, and can find out about 50% security risks 
more than OM. Traditional methods underestimate the very risk, while modeling methods embody it 
properly. so it can be seen that the assessment results from modeling methods are more accurate than 
traditional methods. 
4. Conclusions 
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A security risk assessment model based on simulated attacks is come up with the assessment about the 
enterprise network security risks, and a case is used to clarify the effect of the model and verifies the 
validity of it. Compared with the traditional assessment methods, the model has superiorities as below: 
The assessed conclusions properly reflect the objective reality, so it is more complete and accurate; 
The most dangerous sources or the sequence of risk propagation paths can be located, so it is better for 
security proposals to be drawn up. 
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